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Abstract
Background: Network forms of organization are increasingly popular in primary care. At the end of the 1990s General 
Practitioners (GPs) in Italy were given the opportunity to adopt network forms of organization with the aim of 
improving the quality of their services. However factors affecting GPs' choices to join a network and the consequences 
of network membership have not been evaluated.
Methods: Administrative data of a Local Health Authority in Central Italy were analyzed using statistical methods at 
individual and dyadic levels of analysis.
Results: Homophily factors seem to influence a GP's choice of network. The consequences of network membership on 
GP performances seem very limited.
Conclusions: When considering to foster the diffusion of network organizational forms in health care creating a 
network structure, like that of Italian GPs, is not sufficient. Other features of the implementation phase, work 
organization and human resource management should also be considered.
Background
In organization theory, the idea that a network is a form
of organization of activities like hierarchy (i.e., a company
or a public organization) or market, found legitimacy and
popularity during the first half of 1990 [1-3]. The network
form of governance of activities which is characterized by
"reciprocal patterns of communication and exchange" [1]
has been described as a hybrid form of organizations of
activities offering some advantages over both hierarchies
and markets. During the same period, national and
regional governments deeply reformed the Italian
National Health Service (INHS), and by the end of the
decade a network form of organization of general practice
was institutionalized in various regions [4,5]. Those net-
works of general practitioners (henceforth GPs), termed
"forme associative" in Italian, have been presented by pol-
iticians, administrators and GP unions as the solution to
many of the problems affecting the organization of GPs in
Italy. This is because they create an organizational struc-
ture for otherwise isolated professionals and facilitate
knowledge exchange while maintaining the administra-
tive autonomy that Italian GPs had always enjoyed. In this
article we will describe the structure of GP networks in
Italy and report evidence of the antecedents of their for-
mation and their consequences on GPs' behaviour in one
Italian province.
Networks offer an intermediate arrangement between
the flexibility offered by markets and the stability of hier-
archies. In a network organization actors enjoy an inde-
pendence similar to that which they enjoy in markets and
have incentives in order to increase efficiency and easy-
to-observe quality similar to those present in markets.
These incentives also act to increase GPs' flexibility to
experiment and adopt innovations that may be useful in
their specific context. In addition, when compared to
market exchanges, network arrangements frame repeated
interactions and create greater communication between
GPs, that in turn facilitate knowledge sharing and the dif-
fusion of innovations. Furthermore, better circulation of
information generates greater opportunities to evaluate
difficult-to-observe quality and increases the cost of
behaving opportunistically.
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In a network organization actors also enjoy stability of
relationships similar to that present in hierarchies. Actors
can develop trust and are able to make organization-spe-
cific investments such as specializing in some activities
which would have lower value if the GP was independent
or moved to another organization. But when compared to
hierarchy, networks allow greater efficiency and flexibility
in knowledge-intensive activities. This is mainly because
networks better control opportunistic behaviour through
norms of reciprocity and reputation concerns and there-
fore avoid the need of direct supervision or of ex-ante
specification of processes characterizing bureaucratic
control.
At the individual level of analysis, social network theo-
rists have focused on the behavioural, perceptual, and
attitudinal consequences [6] of the social relationships in
which actors are embedded [7,8]. Those relationships are
the ties linking nodes of the networks and are also said to
be the social capital of actors [9,10]. Ties influence actors'
behaviours through four mechanisms: network closure
determines the social control typical of small and closed
communities; brokerage determines the power and infor-
mational advantage of actors bridging other actors other-
wise disconnected; contagion determines the adoption of
a characteristic of connected actors; and, prominence
which favours the adoption of an actor's characteristic
who is central to the network.
One variable that many social network theorists have
been concerned with is the redundancy of connections,
which is the degree to which an actor's ego network is
made by contacts that are already connected to each
other. Being connected to a highly redundant network
implies having access to fewer resources than someone
connected to a non-redundant network with the same
amount of ties. Non redundant contacts create social
capital through the brokerage mechanism [11].
Methods
Context
The INHS was established in 1978 and was modelled
after the British NHS. It is a mainly public system
financed through general taxation [12]. From an organi-
zational viewpoint the INHS divides the Italian territory
into 180 Local Health Authorities (LHAs) each responsi-
ble for the provision of health services to its population.
GPs are primary care physicians working for LHAs as
independent contractors and act as gatekeepers of higher
levels of care. In 2005 there were 47,022 GPs in Italy cost-
ing about 5 billion Euros, or 6% of public healthcare
expenditure [13]. Traditionally, Italian GPs work in solo
practices without any auxiliary staff or any formal link-
a g e s  w i t h  o t h e r  G P s .  T h e i r  s t a t u s  a s  i n d e p e n d e n t  b u t
exclusive contractors with a LHA is coupled with a
financing system based on capitation: GPs are paid on the
basis of the number of patients on their list [14]. The free-
dom of patients to choose the list they are on and to
switch GP at any moment induces a form of competition
among GPs to maintain current and acquire new patients.
Since the INHS inception in 1978, various initiatives
have slowly but constantly shifted resources and respon-
sibilities to non-hospital settings. The number of hospital
beds in Italy decreased by 28% from 1995 to 2005 [15].
This process of de-hospitalization of care has increased
the workload and the responsibilities of GPs, as they are a
pivotal part of community care, given their gatekeeping
role and their direct knowledge of patients. Nonetheless,
Italian health reforms have not changed the role nor the
organization of the GPs' activities.
The diffusion of network forms of organization eventu-
ally reached the organization of Italian general practitio-
ners through their definition in the national contract
agreement. This represented the main, if not the only,
major organizational innovation of GPs' activity since the
inception of the INHS in 1978. GP networks were and
still are presented as the solution to many of the problems
affecting the organization of primary care in Italy as they
create an organizational structure and facilitate knowl-
edge exchange, while maintaining GPs' administrative
autonomy.
General practitioners networks
The contract according to which GPs provide services on
the behalf of the INHS to citizens enrolled in their list is
negotiated every three years by the GP unions with a gov-
ernmental agency. This contract is the main document
regulating the relationship between GPs and the INHS.
Additionally, integrative contracts may be signed by
unions and INHS organizations at a regional or local
level. Through the national contract organizational inno-
vations, such as the GP networks, are introduced into the
system. The first national contract mentioning the idea
that organizational forms creating some collaboration
among GPs could be negotiated at a local level was signed
in 1996. However, it was only when the contract was
renewed in 2000 that the regulation of GP networks was
detailed.
In the national contract in place at the time of the study,
GPs willing to undertake some form of collaboration in
the provision of health services to their patients can
choose among three forms. They are named association
("medicina in associazione"), net ("medicina in rete"), and
group ("medicina di gruppo") and each implies a different
strength of the collaboration among GPs (Table 1). By
simply joining one of these typified forms GPs have the
right to additional compensation from the INHS which
tops an 18% increase over the base GP salary . None of
these GP networks are legal entities and every contractual
relationship is between the INHS and the individual GP.Fattore and Salvatore BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:118
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In any of these three forms GPs have to coordinate their
office hours to remain open till 7 pm on weekdays and
commit to share guidelines and meet to discuss and
improve their work. Each patient is listed with a GP but
when the GP is unavailable the patient may be examined
by any other GP from the same network. The freedom of
patients to leave their GP and to enrol in the list of
another in the same network is limited in order to miti-
gate the concern GPs may have that, by collaborating they
could lose patients to their colleagues. In the case of net-
works of intermediate intensity, nets, GPs are also
required to share an electronic database of their patients.
While in associations or nets GPs can continue working
in their own offices, but the most intense form, the group,
requires GPs to share clinics and, therefore they can share
investments in medical equipment and employ nursing or
administrative staff. In the LHA analyzed in this study, an
LHA-employed specialist performed ultrasound proce-
dures once a week in each of the group clinics. Although
at the time of the study the LHA was thinking about ask-
ing GPs in groups to increase the sharing of clinics with
specialists, the three network arrangements are essen-
tially uniprofessional organizational forms.
The basic idea behind these networks is that organiza-
tional and professional development in primary care
requires collaboration between GPs and the sharing of
resources and knowledge. This means networks can
improve service delivery (longer office hours, continuity
of care, wider range of services). As of 2004, 59% of Italian
GPs have entered a type of network, 22% of which joined
a group, the more intense organizational form [16]. GP
networks are indeed networks of peers in which each
individual GP is at liberty to choose to join colleagues he/
she prefers. Contrary to experiences in other countries
with primary care organizations, GP networks in Italy are
organizational arrangements in which every member is a
GP and specialists are not involved. Although most
groups (the more intense and less adopted form) employ
a part-time nurse or an administrative assistant, associa-
tions, nets, and groups are better understood as uni-pro-
fessional networks. Members of each network are free to
choose their governance structure, and given that these
organizational forms are small networks of peers which
GPs can leave whenever they wish, it is very likely that
decisions are made by unanimous agreement. Moreover,
the sharing of guidelines and meetings to discuss and
improve professional work, two main requirements of GP
networks, are vaguely defined and very difficult to verify
by the LHA.
Data
Data used for the analysis were provided by the Piacenza
LHA in Emila-Romagna, a region in the central part of
t he  c ou n t ry . T his LHA is  r es pons ibl e  f or a n a r ea wit h
approximately 280.000 inhabitants and comprises of a
town of 100.000. The LHA administrative information
systems contain a large data-set useful to investigate both
antecedents and consequences of participation in GP net-
works. In 2006, the year analyzed in this study, there were
1.23 GPs for every 1,000 residents in the LHA; 69% of
GPs had entered a type of network and 16% of them
joined a group.
Some of the analyses reported here were performed at
the individual level of analysis (i.e. the individual GP) and
some were performed at the dyad-level of analysis (i.e.,
the unit of observation is the pair of GPs). We have there-
fore individual-level data on 223 GPs which, at the dyad-
level of analysis became 49,506 pairs.
The Piacenza LHA did not introduce at the local-level
significant additions to the national-level contract in
place at the time of the study. Therefore, although the
LHA periodically sends to its GPs the statistics on most
indicators used in this study, there was not a formal bud-
geting process recognizing incentives to GPs who meet
LHA's target. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for all
variables.
Table 1: Features of the three forms of collaborative initiatives typified in the national labour contract of GPs (adapted 
from Brunello, 2001).
Associations Nets Groups
Number of members 3 to 10 3 to 10 3 to 8
Minimum number of office hours during weekdays 6 6 6
Shared electronic patient records No Yes Yes
Shared ambulatory No No Yes
Additional income for GP for each enrolled patient 2.58 € (7% increase) 4.70 € (12% increase) 7 € (18% increase)F
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Table 2: Means, standard deviations and correlations of the variables employed in the analyses.
Mean Std.Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. Gender1 0.21
2. DistrictA 0.27 0.21
3. DistrictB 0.06 0.06 -0.15
4. DistrictC 0.19 -0.05 -0.29 -0.12
5. Years since 
graduation
25.10 6.85 -0.36 -0.10 -0.03 0.02
6. Number of 
patients
1111.2
2
463.01 -0.33 0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.50
7. Risk AdjInd. 1.8 0.26 -0.09 0.05 0.45 -0.01 0.17 0.23
8. Specialized 0.65 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.05
9. In any 
network
0.67 -0.06 -0.10 -0.03 -0.12 0.28 0.43 0.13 -0.04
10. Association 0.3 0.08 0.04 0.01 -0.20 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.46
11. Net 0.3 -0.13 -0.31 0.00 0.15 0.21 0.29 0.08 -0.05 0.47 -0.43
12. Group 0.07 -0.01 0.32 -0.07 -0.13 0.03 0.11 0.00 -0.03 0.19 -0.18 -0.18
13. Pharma 115.45 82.29 0.15 0.02 0.24 -0.02 -0.09 -0.11 0.34 0.07 0.06 -0.05 0.10 0.03
14. Home Care 7.23 6.93 -0.04 0.08 0.18 0.27 0.05 0.18 0.20 0.06 -0.04 -0.08 0.06 -0.04 -0.01
15. Multi-prof. 
home care
13.65 12.49 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.27 0.19 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.22F
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16. Printed 
Prescriptions
0.7 0.36 -0.07 0.02 -0.13 -0.21 0.15 0.27 -0.10 0.01 0.43 0.09 0.28 0.14 0.00 0.02 -0.01
17. White Codes 
day
7.09 5.04 -0.01 0.13 -0.15 0.05 0.13 0.42 -0.10 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.12 -0.04 0.02 0.15 0.12 0.1
18. White Codes 
Total
37.85 20.56 -0.09 0.13 -0.15 0.15 0.26 0.60 -0.01 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.16 -0.09 0.06 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.79
19. Preventable 
re-admissions
5.01 3.59 -0.25 -0.10 0.11 -0.11 0.29 0.54 0.27 -0.08 0.20 0.05 0.20 -0.08 -0.05 0.06 0.31 0.07 0.2 0.36
20. Screening 
Paptest
0.44 0.13 0.12 0.44 -0.16 -0.19 0.18 0.15 0.17 -0.02 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.07 -
0.01
-0.02 0.03 0.12 0.13 0.03
21. Screening 
(average)
0.55 0.16 0.05 0.21 -0.21 -0.21 0.24 0.35 0.11 0.06 0.10 -0.02 0.11 0.01 -0.09 -
0.03
0.12 0.2 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.68
22. Performance 
Index
106.75 23.15 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.20 0.05 0.25 0.10 -0.09 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.08 0.26 -
0.24
-0.15 -0.24 0.47 0.53 0.40 -0.1 -0.17
1 Male = 0; Female = 1; See text for further explanation of variables
Table 2: Means, standard deviations and correlations of the variables employed in the analyses. (Continued)Fattore and Salvatore BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:118
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Variables
Participation in a network
Based on administrative data, we created affiliation
matrices linking each GP to all possible networks. The
LHA keeps a record of which network each GP has joined
for its administrative purposes. In the following analyses
w e  u s e d  t h i s  b i n a ry  v a r i a b l e  b o t h  a s  i n d e p e n d e n t  a n d
dependent variables. For the analyses conducted at the
dyadic level of analysis this variable becomes "participa-
tion in the same network" and is coded 1 if both GPs are
members of the same network and 0 if they are members
of different networks or are not members of any network.
Indeed, a connection between two GPs exists when they
are members of the same network. Such type data are
named in social network analysis "affiliation networks"
[17].
GP performance dimensions
GPs' activities are complex and it is impossible to find any
single variable which may satisfactorily represent their
performance. Using the data collected by the LHA, we
reported the analyses at the individual and dyadic levels
on the consequences of participation in GP networks
using ten dependent variables. Nine of them capture spe-
cific aspects of their performance, and one is a perfor-
mance index that summarizes them. The first variable
"Pharma", is per-capita pharmaceutical expenditure of
the patients enrolled with a GP. With the exception of
some particular categories of drugs, patients in Italy need
GP prescriptions to obtain drugs under the INHS. GPs
are therefore gatekeepers of their patients' pharmaceuti-
cal expenditure and they are under pressure to keep it as
low as possible in order to keep INHS expenditure at a
minimum. The second, "Planned Home Care" measures
how many of the GP's patients are examined regularly at
home; home care is specifically encouraged by LHAs as it
is assumed to reduce inappropriate hospitalization and
increase the quality of care for patients. For the same rea-
son, GPs may coordinate a group of other professionals
(for example nurses, therapists and specialists) to regu-
larly examine the patient; the number of patients benefit-
ing from this activity is measured by the "Integrated
home care" variable. Planned home care differs from inte-
grated home care because in the latter the GP not only
visits the patient home but also coordinates the accesses
to the patient's home of a team of health professionals
and specialists. The "Preventable re-admissions" variable
measures the number of patients who are re-admitted to
hospital for conditions that could have been managed
effectively by the GP. This measure detects a lack of ade-
quate continuity of care after the patient's discharge.
"Printed prescription" is the percentage of prescriptions
that have been printed by the GP using a computer (and
thus not handwritten). The printing of prescriptions is
encouraged by the LHA as it guarantees that the GP
keeps an electronic archive, increase safety, and eases
part of the subsequent administrative work. "Screening
Paptest" is the fraction of targeted patients by the paptest
screening program managed by the LHA, who have
joined the program; "Screening (average)" is the average
participation rate of the patients to the three screening
programs that was in operation in the LHA during 2006:
pap-test, mammogram, and colon-rectal. GPs are
a s s u m e d  t o  p l a y  a  r o l e  i n  p r o m o t i n g  h e a l t h  t o  t h e i r
patients and inform them about the advantages of the
screening programs. Two indicators refer to patients'
access to Emergency department and are intended to
capture the role that GPs may have played in its inappro-
priate use. "White Codes day" is the number of patients'
accesses to emergency departments that resulted in a
white code (lowest level of priority) during GPs' working
hours; "White Codes Total" is the same indicator applied
to any access, thus including those at night or during
week-ends. GPs are assumed to be able to manage most
of the non-urgent health issues and white codes can be
partially attributed to the quality of GPs' work. To try to
portray a single measure of the GPs' performance we
ranked each GP according to these nine performance
dimensions and thus we created a tenth variable "Perfor-
mance Index". GPs' performance is a multidimensional
concept which should consider aspects related to quality
of care, organization, patient satisfaction, equity and cost
containment. The "performace index" used in this study
is not a comprehensive indicator of GP performance, but
is simply the average rank of a GP alongside the nine
dependent variables previously presented.
All these variables have been calculated on a per-
patient basis, that is dividing the dependent variable by
the number of patients enrolled in each GP list. For the
analyses at the dyadic level each variable becomes the dif-
ference in the value of the variable of the first and the sec-
ond GP in the dyad.
Control Variables
The control variables used in the models include gender,
the years since the medical degree, a dummy variable
coded 1 if the GP has any kind of specialization other
than the medical degree, the number of patients that are
in the GP's list; an age standardization index depending
on the age of the enlisted patients which is used by the
LHA to weigh the number of patients against their
e x p e c t e d  t o t a l  h e a l t h c a r e  c o s t s .  F i n a l l y  w e  u s e d  t h r e e
dummy variables to identify the district in which the GP
operates. Districts are the organizational units of the
LHA to which GPs refer administratively and are sup-
posed to provide the same primary care services to their
residents. One of the four districts provides services to
the city of Piacenza and it is used as the reference cate-
gory in the statistical analysis. The other three offer ser-
vices to countryside or mountain areas. Districts provideFattore and Salvatore BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:118
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similar services and are organized in similar ways, none-
theless social and geographical characteristics of the
areas differ; moreover districts have a different manage-
ment team and therefore we controlled for this variable in
the analyses and reported it in the models for which it
played a role.
Participation in a network
Based on administrative data, we created affiliation
matrices linking each GP to all possible networks. The
LHA keeps a record of which network each GP has joined
for its administrative purposes. In the following analyses
w e  u s e d  t h i s  b i n a ry  v a r i a b l e  b o t h  a s  i n d e p e n d e n t  a n d
dependent variables. For the analyses conducted at the
dyadic level of analysis this variable becomes "participa-
tion in the same network" and is coded 1 if both GPs are
members of the same network and 0 if they are members
of different networks or are not members of any network.
Indeed, a connection between two GPs exists when they
are members of the same network. Such type data are
named in social network analysis "affiliation networks"
[17]. In the LHA we studied, every network was partici-
pated by GPs in the same district.
Analysis
We used these data to study both the factors affecting the
choice to enter a GP network and the consequences of
being a member. In both cases we performed the analysis
at the individual level and at the dyad level. By "dyad" we
mean each of all the possible pairs of GPs in the sample.
At the dyadic level of analysis values of the variables for
each dyadic observation have been calculated as the dif-
ference of the value of the first GP and the value of the
second in the case of continuous variables, or by the pres-
ence of a characteristic for both GPs in the case of binary
variables.
Along with standard linear and logistic regression we
used two statistical procedures typical of social network
analysis studies: exponential random graph model
(ERGM) and quadratic assignment procedure (QAP).
ERGM, also called the p* class of models, which is a
probability model for networks on a given set of actors
allowing generalization beyond the restrictive dyadic
independence assumption [18,19]. The analysis was per-
formed using the software SIENA [20].
QAP is a multiple regression technique able to regress a
valued matrix on other matrixes and does not assume
independence of observations [21]. MR-QAP was per-
formed using the UCINET software package [22].
Results
Factors affecting the choice to enter a GP network
Table 3 shows the results of a logistic regression for which
the dependant variable was the participation of a GP in
any of the three GP networks. Among the GPs of the
studied LHA, the number of patients has a small but
highly significant effect and being female makes it more
likely to join a network (p < 0.1).
In Table 4 we present an analysis at the dyadic level
which investigates factors predicting the presence of a
connection between two GPs. The analysis uses an
ERGM procedure. The dependant variable is the co-
membership of two GPs in the same collaboration initia-
tive (the level of analysis is thus, dyadic) and the indepen-
dent variables are: being of the same gender, the
difference in the number of years since graduation from
medical school, the GPs' specialization (if any), and the
similarity in the number of patients enrolled. Two vari-
ables are significant: years since graduation and number
of enrolled patients. This suggests that GPs tend to join a
GP network with colleagues of their own generation and
with colleagues that ha ve a similar number of patients
(therefore a similar need of common resources).
Table 3: Results of a Logistic Regression Model for the 
membership in a collaboration initiative (-2 Log likelihood 
= 232.720; Cox & Snell R Square = 0.220; Nagelkerke 
R2 = 0.303).
Variable Beta (standard errors)
Gender 0.812 (0.440)*
Years since graduation 0.032 (0.023)
Specialized -0.453 (0.343)
Number of patients 0.002 (000)**
Constant -2,115 (0.614)**
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05.
Table 4: Results of an exponential random graph 
regression model for the presence of any connection 
between two actors (n = 223).
Variable Estimates (standard errors)
Same Gender -0.0639 (0.1490)
Difference in years since 
graduation
1.5726 (0.5109)**
Both having a medical 
specialisation
-0.0606 (0.1226)
Difference in the number of 
patients
1.7080 (0.3132)**
** p < 0.05F
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Table 5: Standardized regression coefficients (p-value) of linear regression models with individual GPs performance indicators as dependent variables.
Pharma Planned 
Home Care
Integrated 
home care
Preventable 
re-admissions
Printed 
Prescriptions
Screening 
Paptest
Screening 
(average)
White Codes 
day
White Codes 
Total
Performance 
Index
Intercept 0.00 (0.94) 0.09 (0.20) 0.01 (0.88) 0.00 (0.95) 0.02 (0.77) -0.02 (0.69) 0.00 (0.97) 0.00 (0.97) 0.01 (0.92) -0.01 (0.81)
Gender 0.11 (0.11) 0.07 (0.38) 0.04 (0.59) -0.01 (0.95) -0.01 (0.93) 0.15* (0.02) 0.22** (0.00) 0.18* (0.01) 0.23** (0.00) 0.11 (0.13)
DistrictA -0.02 (0.80) 0.09 (0.28) -0.17* (0.04) -0.17* (0.04) -0.02 (0.81) 0.39** (0.00) 0.06 (0.39) 0.06 (0.48) 0.06 (0.38) -0.01 (0.89)
DistrictB 0.05 (0.54) 0.10 (0.26) -0.17* (0.05) -0.08 (0.30) -0.07 (0.34) -0.18** (0.01) -0.30** (0.00) -0.05 (0.51) -0.16* (0.03) -0.01 (0.89)
DistrictC 0.02 (0.81) 0.15 (0.06) -0.14 (0.07) -0.21** (0.01) -0.14* (0.04) -0.14* (0.02) -0.24** (0.00) 0.06 (0.38) 0.18** (0.01) 0.20** (0.00)
Years since 
graduation
-0.03 (0.68) -0.07 (0.44) -0.02 (0.86) -0.01 (0.92) 0.01 (0.94) 0.14* (0.05) 0.16* (0.03) 0.04 (0.62) 0.05 (0.56) -0.09 (0.26)
Number of 
patients
-0.2* (0.02) -0.32** (0.00) -0.17 (0.08) -0.05 (0.56) 0.12 (0.15) 0.11 (0.15) 0.33** (0.00) -0.03 (0.71) -0.09 (0.3) -0.08 (0.33)
Age St. Ind. 0.38** (0.00) 0.11 (0.28) 0.30** (0.00) 0.21* (0.01) -0.12 (0.09) 0.14* (0.03) 0.18* (0.01) -0.26** (0.00) -0.18* (0.02) -0.04 (0.65)
Specialized 0.07 (0.28) -0.01 (0.87) 0.11 (0.11) -0.07 (0.34) 0.05 (0.4) -0.08 (0.16) 0.04 (0.54) -0.03 (0.6) 0.00 (0.99) -0.08 (0.21)
In any network 0.11 (0.14) -0.15 (0.07) -0.13 (0.10) -0.09 (0.26) 0.37** (0.00) 0.04 (0.56) -0.12 (0.09) 0.01 (0.94) -0.11 (0.12) -0.10 (0.19)
In group 0.04 (0.56) -0.04 (0.57) 0.03 (0.66) -0.06 (0.44) 0.04 (0.53) -0.07 (0.27) -0.08 (0.24) -0.08 (0.28) -0.13* (0.05) -0.05 (0.48)
R2 0.19 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.24 0.34 0.30 0.14 0.24 0.14
Adj R2 0.15 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.21 0.31 0.27 0.09 0.21 0.10
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01F
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Table 6: Standardized regression coefficients of quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) regression models with the similarity of any two GPs performance indicators 
as dependent variables.
Dependent variables
ΔΔΔΔΔΔΔ Δ ΔΔ
Pharmaceutica
l expenditure
Planned 
Home care
Integrated 
home care
Printed 
prescriptions
Day-time 
white codes
Total white 
codes
Preventable 
readmissions
Screening 
paptest
Screening 
average
Performance 
index
Intercept 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Same Gender 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Grad YY diff -0.03 -0.07 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.16* 0.08 -0.11
Number patients 
diff
-0.09 -0.20** -0.14* 0.30** -0.13 -0.2** -0.02 0.08 0.30** -0.19**
Age st. diff -0.11* -0.13* 0.08 0.20** 0.01 -0.06 0.17** -0.19** 0.06 -0.11*
Both specialized 
or not
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Same any dist 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Both in any 
network
0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Both in any group 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Both same 
network
0.00 -0.01* -0.01 0.01* 0.00 0.00 00.00.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
R2 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.09
Adj. R2 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.09
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01Fattore and Salvatore BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:118
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Consequences of participation to GP networks
To study the consequences of participating in any GP net-
work, we used an ordinary least square (OLS) regression.
Table 5 reports 10 regression models, where the same set
of regressors are tested and 10 different dependent vari-
ables are used (9 specific measures and an overall perfor-
mance index). The two variables of interest are "in any
network" representing the participation of the GP in any
of the three forms of network, and "in group" represent-
ing the participation in the network implying the most
intense collaboration. As shown in Table 5 being in a net-
work has a positive and significant effect only on the per-
centage of prescriptions printed using a computer. Being
in a group has a significant effect only in reducing the
number of patients going to a hospital emergency depart-
ment for a condition classified as a white code.
To analyze the consequences of participation in a GP
network at the dyadic level we ran a series of QAP regres-
sions using as dependant variables the similarity in each
of the ten performance dimensions of all the possible
dyads of GPs in the sample (Table 6). Being in the same
network significantly makes two GPs similar in the per-
centage of prescriptions they print with a computer, sug-
gesting that some form of contagion or of social control
takes place inside networks. Being in the same network
also makes two GPs significantly more different in the
number of the patients they examine at home, suggesting
that some form of division of labour occurs. Considering
all the dimensions of GP performance for which we had
data, overall, the standardized effect on the similarity of
performance of GPs in shared networks are very small
and generally non-significant.
Discussion
We reported results of a study of factors affecting partici-
pation and consequences of Italian GPs' participation in
three forms of network organizations institutionalized in
the INHS. We found that when GPs are able to choose the
colleagues with whom to form a network, as in Italy, they
tend to join networks of colleagues who are similar in age
and have a similar number of patients in their rosters. We
also found that participation in GP networks has a very
weak effect on most of the performance indicators that
were available. Most of the performance indicators do not
seem to improve for GPs in networks nor are they more
similar among GPs who are in the same network. An
exception is for the number of prescriptions GPs print
rather than handwrite, which is an important dimension
of GP performance as it eases the burden of subsequent
administrative work and it reduces misunderstandings of
drug prescriptions and referrals. However, this may not
be as fundamental as other dimensions more directly
related to patient care. The evidence reported suggests
that the GP networks of the type created and promoted in
Italy at the end 1990s have had modest consequences on
the ability of GPs to care for patients. Specifically, infor-
mal sharing of knowledge may not be present or it may
not have an impact on the performance of GPs measured
in most of the dimensions of performance.
This findings is consistent with those studies compar-
ing in the UK context single handed practices to group
practices showing that group practices do not yield better
health outcomes than single handed practices [23,24].
Although every Italian LHA has autonomy to imple-
ment different organizational arrangements, the organi-
zation of GPs' activities it is fairly similar all over Italy as
GPs are independent contractors whose relationship with
L H A s  i s  m a i n l y  r e g u l a t e d  b y  t h e  n a t i o n a l  c o n t r a c t .
Therefore, our findings from the analysis of Piacenza
LHA's data could likely be reproduced in other Italian
LHAs which did not introduce different local-level
arrangements.
Theoretical contributions on the network form of orga-
nization and on social networks allowed us to identify
four characteristics of the GP network that are regulated
by the Italian GPs' national contract which may have con-
tributed to these results.
First, the contract focused on creating a structure for
knowledge exchange but the presence of a structure does
not imply that knowledge actually flows in the network.
The creation of an interpersonal network does not suf-
fice. Studies on social networks are often heralded as the
tool to uncover the informal dynamics behind organiza-
tional charts [25]. However, because it is empirically diffi-
cult to gather data on actual flow of resources in
networks, most empirical studies have focused on net-
work structure assuming it is a good proxy for the flow of
resources. Many scholars have also posited that structure
has consequences on its own; in management the work of
Ronald Burt [11,26,27] typifies this approach. A concern
with structure can also be found in most public manage-
ment reforms in Italy as organizational structure is con-
sidered the more objective part of the organization, it is
therefore the one bureaucracies are most comfortable
with. But the experience of GP networks in Italy suggests
that the creation of a network structure through the con-
cession of monetary incentives to "get together" and join a
collaboration initiative does not guarantee the sharing of
resources that rhetoric on network promises.
Second, the redundancy of the connections both in
terms of redundancy of ties and of similarity of knowl-
edge possessed by the people connected by those ties
reduces the probability that new knowledge enters the
network. Italian GP networks are essentially uni-profes-
sional organizational forms and, therefore, the diversity
of knowledge resources is not leveraged. Moreover, the
spontaneous birth of social networks is widely believed to
be influenced by homophily (i.e., the tendency to createFattore and Salvatore BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:118
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relationships with someone similar on relevant respects)
[28]. The presence of homophily is confirmed in this set-
t i n g  a s  s u g g e s t e d  b y  T a b l e  4 .  G P s  i n v e s t i g a t e d  i n  t h i s
study tend to join networks of colleagues who graduated
from medical school in the same period. As they are also
likely to have a similar education and knowledge, there is
redundancy in the type of information GPs are able to
access and thus there is a modest impact on professional
relations.
Third, all network forms analysed here are organiza-
tional forms in which parts are undifferentiated. Each GP
in the network performs the same type of activities on
patients who in most cases always see the same GP.
Therefore GP networks in Italy do not leverage the
advantages of specialization that network forms of orga-
nization may create. Furthermore, the lack of strong
interdependencies reduces the possibility of knowledge
exchanges through observation, as can happen if GPs sys-
tematically see patients that are also seen by their col-
leagues.
Finally, the relationship between the INHS and its GPs
has always mainly focused on monetary compensation
with little attention paid to other forms of remuneration
and incentives. The attitude of the INHS towards GPs has
always been transactional rather than relational. A rela-
tional psychological contract is a work relationship that is
understood by the employee and the employer not only as
monetary but also as long-term or open-ended employ-
ment arrangements based upon mutual trust and loyalty
[29]. A transactional attitude, typically reflected in con-
tracts and explicit rules, may induce GPs to perceive their
obligations as simply fulfilling the clear expectations of
the organizational standards. A more relational approach
may induce GPs to perceive their obligations as working
together to achieve the complex goals for which GP net-
works were introduced and to invest in the relation per
se.
The introduction of GP networks has focused on incen-
tives to motivate GPs to enter such networks, without
sufficient attention to the context necessary to allow net-
working to have an impact on the way professionals work.
The government succeeded in having GPs accepting to
join these collaborative initiatives, but the evidence we
collected does not support the claim that these networks
modify how professionals take care of their patients.
Most likely, they are structural arrangements that do not
change the pattern of communication among members.
Conclusions
These findings suggest that managerial strategies which
try to increase networking among employees should not
focus solely on the creation of structure, as it has often
been done in the INHS, but should focus instead on the
creation of a need to access others' resources. Italian GPs
in the same network are not interdependent, and there-
fore, being part of the same network implies neither
interaction nor exchange. Moreover, in order to take
advantage of the informational advantages of network
form of organizations, members should be selected in
order to have heterogeneous competencies so that each
actor can find the knowledge needed in a specific situa-
tion by activating the more expert colleague in the net-
work on the issue at stake. Another important lesson that
can be learned from the introduction of GP networks in
Italy is in the way the adoption of complex organizational
structures should be promoted among GPs.
Focusing only on monetary incentives induces GPs to
comply with the contractual requirement which,
although superficial, is observable and thus enforceable.
Since it is too difficult to enforce a contract requiring
knowledge exchange among GPs, and it is also difficult to
design an incentive structure to reward successful knowl-
edge exchange in medicine, the type of exchange should
be more relational in nature.
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